Is It Okay for a Jury to Know that an Accident Victim Has Insurance that Will Pay for Her Damages?
After a woman rear-ended a vehicle, the other driver filed suit. The case proceeded to trial, and the jury awarded the plaintiff $2,000,000 in damages. The woman filed a motion for new trial, which the court denied. On appeal, she argued that the trial court erred by allowing the plaintiff’s counsel to tell the jury that she had liability insurance coverage, which is prejudicial.
Background
On July 11, 2018, the plaintiff was driving on Interstate 16 near Savannah, and as he approached Chatham Parkway, the traffic stopped. He hit his brakes and came to a stop, but the defendant was couldn’t stop in time and hit his truck from behind. Although the defendant felt “very shaky” immediately after the collision, he didn’t report any pain at the crash scene. He was able to work the next two days after the accident. Over the weekend however, he noticed pain in his lower back, and he sought medical treatment the following Monday. Before this ER visit, he’d never sought any treatment for lower back pain. He was diagnosed with a muscle/lumbar strain and advised to seek follow-up treatment. However, he didn’t go to the suggested clinic, but instead sought treatment with a chiropractor. The plaintiff testified that the treatment he received didn’t improve his condition. He also had an MRI which showed extensive, pre-existing spinal degeneration, and he underwent lumbar spinal fusion surgery in May 2021.
The plaintiff filed a personal injury action against the defendant, raising claims for negligence and negligence per se and seeking general and special damages, including damages for past and future medical expenses and lost income. Before trial, the defendant filed a motion to exclude references to the existence of liability insurance or coverage, arguing that “[a]ny reference or inference by counsel or witnesses regarding insurance increases the danger of prejudicially impressing upon the jurors the fact that [the defendant] has or may have had liability insurance.” The plaintiff didn’t object, and the trial court granted the defendant’s motion to excluded this fact.
The plaintiff sought $850,000 in past and future medical expenses. The defendant acknowledged responsibility for the collision but contended that the plaintiff’s current complaints and medical problems were due to pre-existing and unrelated conditions and weren’t the result of the accident. At trial, the jury heard testimony from the plaintiff, as well as from several physicians who opined as to his medical treatment and condition. The plaintiff couldn’t recall if his physicians informed him about whether his spinal bulges and herniations were related to the accident. When the defendant took the stand, she admitted that she was involved in a collision with the plaintiff’s vehicle after traffic slowed ahead of her and she wasn’t able to stop in time.
Would the Defendant be Personally Responsible if She Had Insurance?
During closing argument, the defendant’s counsel conceded that the defendant wasn’t contesting liability for the car accident. However, he then noted the plaintiff’s MRI that showed broad based disc bulging but didn’t show herniation. However, two years later, his MRI showed herniations in the lumbar spine that the defendant’ counsel described as “entirely consistent with regression of degenerative conditions in the spine.”
The defense counsel set out the evidence that he contended proved the plaintiff’s condition was degenerative and unrelated to the accident. The plaintiff’s counsel didn’t object to these statements during closing argument, but after the defendant’s counsel had concluded his argument, the parties had a bench conference with the judge. The plaintiff’s counsel argued that the defendant opened the door to evidence of liability insurance coverage to counter the representation that the defendant “is going to be responsible for any judgment paid in this case.”
By interjecting that the defendant would be personally responsible, it would mislead the jury, and it improperly would suggest to them that she’d be personally responsible for any burden, which wasn’t actually the case. As a result, the plaintiff’s counsel requested permission to inform the jury that the defendant had auto insurance and it applied to this case. The defendant’s counsel strongly objected, maintaining that the introduction of liability insurance constitutes reversible error. The trial court ruled that the plaintiff’s counsel could tell the jury about the defendant’s insurance coverage, reasoning that the defendant’s counsel’s statements that the plaintiff wanted her to pay the medical bills, “rather than saying [he] wants damages awarded,” would permit argument that the defendant had liability coverage. The defendant’s counsel again objected and moved for a mistrial, and the court noted his objection for the record.
The plaintiff’s counsel then made his closing argument to the jury. He pointed to a lack of evidence contradicting his case and requested past and future medical expenses of approximately $850,000, and $1,600,000 for past and future pain and suffering. The plaintiff’s counsel then explained to the jury:
There’s a couple of comments that the defendant’s counsel made that I want to, just imply to you that is appealing to your sympathy and not to the law and all what you have to follow. The defendant’s counsel told you that the plaintiff wanted the defendant to pay for medical expenses to the chiropractor and for future surgery. In reality, the defendant has auto insurance. We’re asking her auto insurance to pay — State Farm.
The defendant’s objected, and the trial court overruled the objection. When the proceedings resumed the following morning, defense counsel again moved for a mistrial on the ground of the improper mention of liability insurance coverage. The defendant’s counsel specifically addressed the potential harm of the improper injection of this information, noting that “to say that we’re not asking her to pay anything, because she has State Farm Insurance, is misleading to the jury, because it infers that there’s enough insurance to pay all of that, which is far from it. So I think it opens the door to a mess that can’t be fixed.” In denying the motion for a mistrial, the court ruled that the evidence of liability insurance was “admissible for a relevant purpose to explain to the jury, any misconception that the defendant would be personally held responsible for these damages.”
The trial court then instructed the jury on the law to be applied in the case, and told the jury that “the existence of a liability insurance policy should have no bearing on your decision to award or not award damages in this case, nor should it have any bearing on the amount of damages awarded if deemed appropriate.”
The defense counsel excepted to the charge, which hadn’t been discussed at the previous day’s charge conference, arguing that the court’s instruction emphasized that there was perhaps an insurance policy—which shouldn’t have been brought up at all in the trial and certainly not emphasized in the jury charge. The defendant’s attorney renewed the motion for mistrial based on the introduction of the liability policy, and he maintained that the court’s curative instruction was inadequate. The court denied the renewed motion for a mistrial.
After deliberations, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and awarded him $2 million in damages, including $621,000 in special damages and $1,379,000 in general damages. The defendant filed a motion for new trial, arguing that the trial court erred by allowing the plaintiff’s counsel to disclose to the jury that the defendant had liability insurance— thus implying that she wouldn’t have to personally pay the judgment rendered against her — and erred in charging the jury as to the existence of liability insurance. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion for new trial, finding that O.C.G.A. § 24-4-411 afforded the court discretion to admit evidence of insurance and it allowed the jury to be permitted to learn of the presence of insurance to correct any misconception that the defendant would solely be responsible for any verdict entered in the case.
On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred by permitting the plaintiff’s counsel to inform the jury that the defendant had liability insurance coverage, and she therefore is entitled to a new trial. She contended that this disclosure violated O.C.G.A. § 24-4-411 and was extraordinarily prejudicial. She also maintained that the trial court erred by finding that her counsel’s statements “opened the door” to disclosure of her insurance coverage, and the court’s purported curative instruction didn’t remedy the error.
The Court of Appeals Decision
Judge Elizabeth Gobeil wrote that the trial judge in passing on motions for mistrial has a broad discretion, dependent on the circumstances of each case that won’t be disturbed unless manifestly abused. And the denial of a motion for a new trial is also a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court. Here, after the trial court let the plaintiff’s counsel disclose to the jury that the defendant had insurance, the defendant’s counsel moved for a mistrial. In denying the motion, the trial court relied on O.C.G.A. § 24-4-411, and deemed the fact that the defendant was insured “admissible for a relevant purpose to explain to the jury, any misconception that Ms. the defendant would be personally held responsible for these damages.”
O.C.G.A. § 24-4-411 provides:
In all civil proceedings involving a claim for damages, evidence that a person was or was not insured against liability shall not be admissible except as provided in this Code section. This Code section shall not require the exclusion of evidence of insurance against liability in proceedings … when such evidence is offered for a relevant purpose, including, but not limited to, proof of agency, ownership, or control, and the court finds that the danger of unfair prejudice is substantially outweighed by the probative value of the evidence.
The statute states well-settled law in Georgia that the erroneous injection of insurance into a tort case is grounds for a mistrial because of its irrelevance and prejudicial value. Such evidence is highly prejudicial and can influence the entire case—no matter which side attempts to introduce it. Judge Gobeil explained that the strict exclusion of evidence of insurance is due primarily to the assumption that a knowledge of the fact of insurance against liability will motivate the jury to be reckless in awarding damages to be paid, not by the defendant, but by a supposedly well-pursed and heartless insurance company that has already been paid for taking the risk.
The Court of Appeals agreed with the defendant that the trial court erred by permitting the plaintiff’s counsel to disclose to the jury the fact that the defendant had liability insurance coverage. Judge Gobeil said the defendant’s counsel’s statements that the plaintiff was “asking [the jury] to make the defendant pay for” the chiropractic care and future surgeries were “not inconsistent with the existence of insurance coverage [such that the defendant] did not open the door to admission of evidence that she was covered by insurance,” quoting a 2001 decision. In addition, the fact of insurance coverage was not offered for a proper purpose, such as:
- Proof of agency, ownership, or control;
- Impeachment; or
- To show bias.
Instead, the trial court permitted argument on the fact of insurance coverage for the very reason that such evidence is prohibited — to convey to the jury that State Farm, rather than the defendant, would be responsible for paying any damages awarded by the jury.
Because the improper injection of liability coverage likely prejudiced the defendant’s case, the Court of Appeals agreed that the trial court committed reversible error. The judgment was reversed in part and vacated in part. Woods v. Hea th, 2024 Ga. App. LEXIS 244, 2024 WL 3081617 (Ga. App. June 21, 2024).
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The plaintiff’s counsel in this case made a mistake, meaning that the million-dollar jury verdict wasn’t proper, and the trial had to be conducted for a second time. That’s why you need an experienced Atlanta personal injury attorney representing you if you suffer injuries in an automobile accident. Having a knowledgeable attorney whom Atlanta residents trust and who has experience handling motor vehicle accident cases does matter. Whoever you hire as your personal injury car accident lawyer needs to know the law and how to apply the law. We’re happy to answer your questions. We offer free consultations to all prospective clients.
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